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Question 273 MSQ · 4.0 marks
Which of the following are best practices associated with Streaming applications?
6406533052899.
Use a message store that supports message replay so that no data is lost in
processing.
6406533052900.
“Hot potato” principle is when the streaming application operates on the
minimum amount of processing to produce valid output, which then becomes input for the next
minimal processor, and so on, thus ensuring that no single process is doing too many things in
one go.
6406533052901.
Hadoop is best suited for executing Streaming applications.
6406533052902.
Use checkpointing when faced with mission-critical workloads that require
100% accuracy.
6406533052903.
Handle state pollution by restarting the persistent store software periodically.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
You are given the task of improving the performance of a Spark SQL program that is doing a
simple count after a series of transformations. You suspect that the culprit is the main
transformation job in the program. When you run EXPLAIN on that SQL, you see that Spark
wrongly estimates that there are only 10 values for the key on which the main transformation job
is hinged upon, whereas in reality the underlying data has a million values for that key. What
actions would you perform from the below to improve performance of the program?
6406533052914.
Create all tables as external tables.
6406533052915.
Ensure cost based optimizer (CBO) is ON.
6406533052916.
Partition all tables on the same key on which the aggregate is happening.
6406533052917.
Run ANALYZE on all tables to ensure the right estimates are available to the
optimizer.
6406533052918.
Cache the table in a step with actions ahead of the SQL statement that is the
culprit.
**Game Theory**
**Section Id :** 64065364229
**Section Number :** 11
**Section type :** Online
**Mandatory or Optional :** Mandatory
**Number of Questions :** 13
**Number of Questions to be attempted :** 13
**Section Marks :** 45
**Display Number Panel :** Yes
**Section Negative Marks :** 0
**Group All Questions :** No
**Enable Mark as Answered Mark for Review and**
No
**Clear Response :**
**Maximum Instruction Time :** 0
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Suppose that you receive a piece of e-mail whose subject line contains the phrase “check this out”
(a popular phrase among scammers). Based just on thus and without looking at the sender or the
message content, what is the chance that the message is spam? Suppose that 40% of all your
emails are spam and the remaining 60% are emails you want to receive. Suppose that 1% of all
spam messages contain the phrase “check this out” in their subject lines, while 0.4% of all non-
spam messages contain this phrase.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
What is the total probability of having the phrase “check this out” in subject line of an email?
6406533052981.
0.64
6406533052982.
0.064
6406533052983.
0.0064
6406533052984.
0.00064
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Suppose that you receive a piece of e-mail whose subject line contains the phrase “check this out”
(a popular phrase among scammers). Based just on thus and without looking at the sender or the
message content, what is the chance that the message is spam? Suppose that 40% of all your
emails are spam and the remaining 60% are emails you want to receive. Suppose that 1% of all
spam messages contain the phrase “check this out” in their subject lines, while 0.4% of all non-
spam messages contain this phrase.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
What is the probability that the message is spam if subject contains the phrase “check this out”?
6406533052985.
0.625
6406533052986.
0.0625
6406533052987.
0.00625
6406533052988.
0.000625
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A market game has two buyers and one seller. Seller 1 has a watch whose worth for him is ₹2000
and he offers it for sale. Players 2 and 3 are two potential buyers who do not own a watch. The
worth of watch is ₹2800 for one buyer (player 2) and ₹3000 for the other buyer (player 3). Each
buyer is interested in paying the lowest price for the watch and unwilling to pay more than the
watch's worth to him. Describe the game in coalition form and answer the given subquestions.
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Five bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed
bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy answer the given subquestions:
Optimal bid for a bidder with valuation 0.75 will be
6406533053029.
0.7
6406533053030.
0.6
6406533053031.
0.5
6406533053032.
0.75
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Five bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed
bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy answer the given subquestions:
The expected revenue of the seller in this auction scenario will be
6406533053033.
4/5
6406533053034.
3/5
6406533053035.
2/3
6406533053036.
2/5
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider following two statements about this game and choose the correct alternative
P: (D, R) is a Nash equilibrium.
Q: Elimination of weakly dominated strategies also eliminates (D, R), a Nash equilibrium.
6406533053041.
Only P is correct
6406533053042.
Only Q is correct
6406533053043.
Both P and Q are correct
6406533053044.
None is correct
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
**Mathematical Thinking**
**Section Id :** 64065364230
**Section Number :** 12
**Section type :** Online
**Mandatory or Optional :** Mandatory
**Number of Questions :** 3
**Number of Questions to be attempted :** 3
**Section Marks :** 40
**Display Number Panel :** Yes
**Section Negative Marks :** 0
**Group All Questions :** No
**Enable Mark as Answered Mark for Review and**
No
**Clear Response :**
**Maximum Instruction Time :** 0
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
