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Question 2 NAT · 2.0 marks
Three machines, A, B, and C, produce respectively 50%, 30% and 20% of the total no. of items of a
factory. The percentages of defective output of these machines are 3%, 4% and 5%.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If an item is selected at random, the probability that the item is defective is _____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Three machines, A, B, and C, produce respectively 50%, 30% and 20% of the total no. of items of a
factory. The percentages of defective output of these machines are 3%, 4% and 5%.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Suppose an item is selected at random and found to be defective. The probability that the item
was produced by machine A will be _____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as
capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here,
is the standalone benefit,
>0
measures the network effect,
is the expected number of users joining the network and θ is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as
capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here,
is the standalone benefit,
>0
measures the network effect,
is the expected number of users joining the network and θ is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as
capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here,
is the standalone benefit,
>0
measures the network effect,
is the expected number of users joining the network and θ is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as
capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here,
is the standalone benefit,
>0
measures the network effect,
is the expected number of users joining the network and θ is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as
capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here,
is the standalone benefit,
>0
measures the network effect,
is the expected number of users joining the network and θ is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
is (more than one options are correct)
6406536025853.
increasing function of
6406536025854.
decreasing function of
6406536025855.
decreasing function of
6406536025856.
increasing function of
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider the market for a single network good as discussed in the lecture, and write a different
consumer’s utility function for joining the network as
capturing the idea that it
may be more plausible that a user who has a higher value for the standalone component of a
technology also assigns more importance to the size of its network (i.e., consumers differ in their
valuation of both the standalone and the network benefits). Here,
is the standalone benefit,
>0
measures the network effect,
is the expected number of users joining the network and θ is
uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The fulfilled-expectations demand curve in this setting will be **(consider (1-n)=m)**
Two roommates need to each choose to clean their apartment, and each can choose an amount of
time
to clean. If their choices are
and
, then the player
’s payoff is given by
. (This payoff function implies that the more one roommate cleans, the less
valuable is cleaning for the other roommate.)
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
What is the best response of roommate 2 if roommate 1 chooses
=0?
= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Two roommates need to each choose to clean their apartment, and each can choose an amount of
time
to clean. If their choices are
and
, then the player
’s payoff is given by
. (This payoff function implies that the more one roommate cleans, the less
valuable is cleaning for the other roommate.)
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Any
is dominated by
.
6406536025862.
True
6406536025863.
False
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Two roommates need to each choose to clean their apartment, and each can choose an amount of
time
to clean. If their choices are
and
, then the player
’s payoff is given by
. (This payoff function implies that the more one roommate cleans, the less
valuable is cleaning for the other roommate.)
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If the unique, symmetric Nash equilibrium in pure strategy for this game is represented by
then the value of
will be __________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
= _______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider following two statements and choose the correct alternative
(I) This game has symmetrical players.
(II) Players 1 and 2 are only symmetric players in this game.
6406536025880.
Only (I) is correct
6406536025881.
Only (II) is correct
6406536025882.
Both (I) and (II) are correct
6406536025883.
None is correct
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Consider following two statements and choose the correct alternative
(I) This game has a null player.
(II) Player 4 is null player.
6406536025884.
Only (I) is correct
6406536025885.
Only (II) is correct
6406536025886.
Both (I) and (II) are correct
6406536025887.
None is correct
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If
is Shapley–Shubik power index of player 1,
= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If
is Shapley–Shubik power index of player 2, = ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If
is Shapley–Shubik power index of player 3, = ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Given the game [61; 40, 40, 30, 10]. Write the game as a coalition function and find out symmetric
and null players. Also, calculate Shapley–Shubik power index for the game.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If
is Shapley–Shubik power index of player 4,
= ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 1 will be _____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 2 will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 3 will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 4 will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 5 will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A cable TV station wants to connect six new customers to its network. The connections to the
network are described in the following tree graph:
Calculate the distribution of the costs among the six players if all six decide to connect to the
network.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
The cost to be paid by Player 6 will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Five bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed
bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy answer the given subquestions:
Optimal bid for a bidder with valuation 0.9 will be
6406536025898.
0.72
6406536025899.
0.65
6406536025900.
0.5
6406536025901.
0.75
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Five bidders with private valuations uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 participate in a sealed
bid first price auction. Assuming that everyone is playing the symmetric equilibrium bidding
strategy answer the given subquestions:
The expected revenue of the seller in this auction scenario will be
6406536025902.
4/5
6406536025903.
3/5
6406536025904.
2/3
6406536025905.
2/5
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that
denotes immediate exit,
denotes exit this quarter, and
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
There are no strictly dominated strategies in this game.
6406536025906.
True
6406536025907.
False
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that
denotes immediate exit,
denotes exit this quarter, and
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
weakly dominated strategy in this game is
6406536025908.
E
6406536025909.
T
6406536025910.
N
6406536025911.
None of these
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that
denotes immediate exit,
denotes exit this quarter, and
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game are (More than one options correct)
6406536025912.
(E, T)
6406536025913.
(E, N)
6406536025914.
(N, E)
6406536025915.
(T, N)
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that
denotes immediate exit,
denotes exit this quarter, and
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
This game has unique mixed strategy equilibrium
6406536025916.
True
6406536025917.
False
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Consider two competing firms in a declining industry that cannot support both firms profitably.
Each firm has three possible choices as it must decide whether or not to exit the industry
immediately, at the end of this quarter, or at the end of the next quarter. If a firm chooses to exit,
then its payoff is 0 from that point onward. Every quarter that both firms operate yields each a
loss equal to −1, and each quarter that a firm operates alone yields a payoff of 2. For example, if
firm 1 plans to exit at the end of this quarter while firm 2 plans to exit at the end of the next
quarter then the payoffs are (−1, 1) because both firms lose −1 in the first quarter and firm 2 gains
2 in the second. The payoff for each firm is the sum of its quarterly payoffs. Formulate this as a
normal form game considering that
denotes immediate exit,
denotes exit this quarter, and
denote exit next quarter.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
If Randomization probability of
is
and that of
is
, the value of
will be _____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A man dies, leaving an estate worth 500 units. The deceased has two creditors; one’s claim is 450
units, and the other’s claim, 250 units. The division of the estate between them is carried out
according to the contested garment principle.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Creditor 1 with claim 450 units gets
6406536025919.
350
6406536025920.
300
6406536025921.
200
6406536025922.
250
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A man dies, leaving an estate worth 500 units. The deceased has two creditors; one’s claim is 450
units, and the other’s claim, 250 units. The division of the estate between them is carried out
according to the contested garment principle.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Creditor 2 with claim 250 units gets
6406536025923.
150
6406536025924.
300
6406536025925.
200
6406536025926.
250
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot **a** has a clickthrough rate of 10 and
slot **b** has a clickthrough rate of 5. Three advertisers are interested in these slots. Advertiser **x**
values click at 3 per click, advertiser **y** values click at 2 per click, and advertiser **z** values click at 1
per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
Total valuation of socially optimal allocation will be ___________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot **a** has a clickthrough rate of 10 and
slot **b** has a clickthrough rate of 5. Three advertisers are interested in these slots. Advertiser **x**
values click at 3 per click, advertiser **y** values click at 2 per click, and advertiser **z** values click at 1
per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
VCG price for slot **a** will be ______________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Suppose a search engine has two ad slots that it can sell. Slot **a** has a clickthrough rate of 10 and
slot **b** has a clickthrough rate of 5. Three advertisers are interested in these slots. Advertiser **x**
values click at 3 per click, advertiser **y** values click at 2 per click, and advertiser **z** values click at 1
per click.
Based on the above data, answer the given subquestions.
VCG price for slot **b** will be ____________
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
Suppose 6 numbers are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on the interval [0, 1]
and then sorted from smallest to largest. The expected value of the number in second position on
the list is
6406536025930.
5/6
6406536025931.
2/7
6406536025932.
1/2
6406536025933.
1/3
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
A stable matching system is necessarily a system under which everyone is
satisfied.
6406536025935.
A matching system is stable when an unmatched pair may find it beneficial to
deviate from the matching and form their own match.
6406536025936.
Both A stable matching system is necessarily a system under which everyone
is satisfied and A matching system is stable when an unmatched pair may find it beneficial to
deviate from the matching and form their own match.
6406536025937.
None of these
A published solution is not available for this question yet.
