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Question 313 MCQ · 2.0 marks
FoodFleet: A food-delivery startup’s customer journey map (CJM) shows “emotional valleys” around
order delays and unclear driver updates.
[FoodFleet] The next logical step in the KDT process is to:
Answer the question based on the scenario given:
6406535903604.
Conduct silent brainstorming to interpret emotional valleys
6406535903605.
Cluster the identified valleys into problem themes
6406535903606.
Simplify the CJM to avoid focusing on valley moments
6406535903607.
Directly move to define desired results (ENV model)
**Game Theory and Strategy**
**Section Id :** 640653121920
**Section Number :** 15
**Section type :** Online
**Mandatory or Optional :** Mandatory
**Number of Questions :** 6
**Number of Questions to be attempted :** 6
**Section Marks :** 25
**Display Number Panel :** Yes
**Section Negative Marks :** 0
**Group All Questions :** No
**Enable Mark as Answered Mark for Review and** No
**Clear Response :**
**Section Maximum Duration :** 0
**Section Minimum Duration :** 0
**Section Time In :** Minutes
**Maximum Instruction Time :** 0
Published solution
**1. Organize the findings:** The customer journey has already identified emotional valleys. Group related delay and update problems into coherent problem themes before defining desired results.
**Answer: B — Cluster the identified valleys into problem themes.**
**Review note:** This exported question belongs to the preceding design-thinking section, not Game Theory. Its last option also contains extracted section metadata; review its inclusion and formatting.
A: **Incorrect:** Interpretation can contribute, but the next organizing action is to cluster the findings.
B: **Correct:** Clustering turns the observed pain points into problem themes.
C: **Incorrect:** Removing valley moments discards the evidence needed to define the problem.
D: **Incorrect:** Defining outcomes directly skips organizing the identified problems.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
Suppose one ball is picked from the red majority urn. What is the probability that the ball is blue?
6406535903610.
1/4
6406535903611.
3/4
6406535903612.
1/5
6406535903613.
3/5
Published solution
**1. Count blue balls:** In a red-majority urn the blue fraction is \(1/4\).
**Answer: A — 1/4.**
A: **Correct:** This equals the required probability.
B: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 1/4.
C: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 1/4.
D: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 1/4.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
What is the probability that the urn is red-majority if the first student draws a red ball?
6406535903614.
2/5
6406535903615.
3/5
6406535903616.
3/4
6406535903617.
1/4
Published solution
**1. Apply Bayes’ rule:** The prior probabilities of the two urn types are equal.
**2. Update on red:** \[P(R\text{-majority}\mid R)=\frac{3/4}{3/4+1/4}=3/4.\]
**Answer: C — 3/4.**
A: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/4.
B: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/4.
C: **Correct:** This equals the required probability.
D: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/4.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
Should the first student guess the urn to be blue majority (in continuation to the previous
question)?
6406535903618.
Yes
6406535903619.
No
Published solution
**1. Compare posteriors:** After a red draw, red majority has probability \(3/4\) and blue majority has probability \(1/4\). Choose the more likely red-majority urn.
**Answer: B — No.**
A: **Incorrect:** Blue majority has the lower posterior probability.
B: **Correct:** The rational guess is red majority.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
Now suppose, first three students draw the ball in the sequence (Red, Red, Blue).
What is the probability of getting this sequence if the urn is a blue-majority urn?
6406535903620.
3/64
6406535903621.
9/64
6406535903622.
3/16
6406535903623.
9/16
Published solution
**1. Use independent draws:** Under blue majority, red has probability \(1/4\) and blue \(3/4\).
**2. Multiply in order:** \[P(RRB\mid B\text{-majority})=(1/4)^2(3/4)=3/64.\]
**Answer: A — 3/64.**
**Review note:** This uses independent draws with replacement, as in the standard information-cascade model. The passage does not explicitly specify replacement; sampling without replacement gives different probabilities. The supplied scoring key follows replacement.
A: **Correct:** This equals the required probability.
B: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/64.
C: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/64.
D: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/64.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
Now suppose, first three students draw the ball in the sequence (Red, Red, Blue).
What is the probability of getting this sequence if the urn is a red-majority urn?
6406535903624.
3/64
6406535903625.
9/64
6406535903626.
3/16
6406535903627.
9/16
Published solution
**1. Use independent draws:** Under red majority, red has probability \(3/4\) and blue \(1/4\).
**2. Multiply in order:** \[P(RRB\mid R\text{-majority})=(3/4)^2(1/4)=9/64.\]
**Answer: B — 9/64.**
**Review note:** This uses independent draws with replacement, as in the standard information-cascade model. The passage does not explicitly specify replacement; sampling without replacement gives different probabilities. The supplied scoring key follows replacement.
A: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 9/64.
B: **Correct:** This equals the required probability.
C: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 9/64.
D: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 9/64.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
Now suppose, first three students draw the ball in the sequence (Red, Red, Blue).
What is the total probability of getting this sequence?
6406535903628.
3/16
6406535903629.
9/32
6406535903630.
9/16
6406535903631.
3/32
Published solution
**1. Obtain conditional likelihoods:** They are \(3/64\) for blue majority and \(9/64\) for red majority.
**2. Average over the prior:** \[P(RRB)=\tfrac12(3/64)+\tfrac12(9/64)=3/32.\]
**Answer: D — 3/32.**
**Review note:** This uses independent draws with replacement, as in the standard information-cascade model. The passage does not explicitly specify replacement; sampling without replacement gives different probabilities. The supplied scoring key follows replacement.
A: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/32.
B: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/32.
C: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/32.
D: **Correct:** This equals the required probability.
Consider the example of cascade discussed in the lecture but with a modification that now the urn
is containing either 3 blue balls and 1 red ball or 3 red balls and 1 blue ball with equal probability.
That simply means that the urn is equally likely to be blue-majority urn or red-majority urn. We
assume everyone hears what the previous individuals report and get their own private signal by
randomly drawing one ball from the urn.
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
Now suppose, first three students draw the ball in the sequence (Red, Red, Blue).
What is the probability of urn being red-majority in this scenario?
6406535903632.
3/16
6406535903633.
1/4
6406535903634.
3/64
6406535903635.
3/4
Published solution
**1. Compare likelihoods:** The sequence RRB has likelihood \(9/64\) under red majority and \(3/64\) under blue majority.
**2. Normalize:** Equal priors cancel, so \[P(R\text{-majority}\mid RRB)=\frac{9/64}{9/64+3/64}=3/4.\]
**Answer: D — 3/4.**
**Review note:** This uses independent draws with replacement, as in the standard information-cascade model. The passage does not explicitly specify replacement; sampling without replacement gives different probabilities. The supplied scoring key follows replacement.
A: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/4.
B: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/4.
C: **Incorrect:** This differs from the required probability 3/4.
D: **Correct:** This equals the required probability.
Both (Slow, Slow) is an NE & (Slow, Fast) is an NE
6406535903639.
None of these
Published solution
Player 1 owns rows; player 2 owns columns. Each pair is (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & Slow & Fast \\ Slow & (6,6) & (0,2) \\ Fast & (2,0) & (1,1)\end{array}\]
**1. Compare best responses:** Against Slow, each player strictly prefers Slow; against Fast, each strictly prefers Fast. Thus (Slow,Slow) and (Fast,Fast) are pure Nash equilibria.
**2. Check the offered profiles:** (Slow,Fast) is not a mutual best response, so only the first listed statement is true.
**Answer: A — (Slow, Slow) is an NE.**
A: **Correct:** Both players best respond at (Slow,Slow).
B: **Incorrect:** At least one player gains by switching to match the other.
C: **Incorrect:** The asymmetric profile is not a Nash equilibrium.
D: **Incorrect:** The first listed profile is an equilibrium.
Player 1 owns rows; player 2 owns columns. Each pair is (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & Slow & Fast \\ Slow & (6,6) & (0,2) \\ Fast & (2,0) & (1,1)\end{array}\]
**1. Apply the strict criterion:** A pure strategy is evolutionarily stable when its payoff against itself strictly exceeds a rare mutant’s payoff against it.
**2. Check both:** Slow gives 6 against Slow, while a Fast mutant gives 2; Fast gives 1 against Fast, while a Slow mutant gives 0. Both inequalities are strict.
**Answer: C — Both Slow and Fast.**
A: **Incorrect:** Slow is stable, but Fast is stable too.
B: **Incorrect:** Fast is stable, but Slow is stable too.
C: **Correct:** Both pure strategies resist invasion by the other.
D: **Incorrect:** Both pure strategies satisfy the strict ESS criterion.
In a stable matching when men propose to women, answer is case sensitive
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
A will be matched with ________________
Published solution
**1. First proposals:** a and d propose to C; b and c propose to B. C retains d over a, and B retains c over b.
**2. Continue:** Rejected a proposes to B and is rejected again, then D accepts him. Rejected b proposes to A and is accepted.
**3. Read the final matching:** (A,b), (B,c), (C,d), (D,a). Lower ranks denote higher preference.
**Answer: b.**
In a stable matching when men propose to women, answer is case sensitive
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
B will be matched with ________________
Published solution
**1. First proposals:** a and d propose to C; b and c propose to B. C retains d over a, and B retains c over b.
**2. Continue:** Rejected a proposes to B and is rejected again, then D accepts him. Rejected b proposes to A and is accepted.
**3. Read the final matching:** (A,b), (B,c), (C,d), (D,a). Lower ranks denote higher preference.
**Answer: c.**
In a stable matching when men propose to women, answer is case sensitive
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
C will be matched with ________________
Published solution
**1. First proposals:** a and d propose to C; b and c propose to B. C retains d over a, and B retains c over b.
**2. Continue:** Rejected a proposes to B and is rejected again, then D accepts him. Rejected b proposes to A and is accepted.
**3. Read the final matching:** (A,b), (B,c), (C,d), (D,a). Lower ranks denote higher preference.
**Answer: d.**
In a stable matching when men propose to women, answer is case sensitive
Based on the data,answer the given subquestions
D will be matched with ________________
Published solution
**1. First proposals:** a and d propose to C; b and c propose to B. C retains d over a, and B retains c over b.
**2. Continue:** Rejected a proposes to B and is rejected again, then D accepts him. Rejected b proposes to A and is accepted.
**3. Read the final matching:** (A,b), (B,c), (C,d), (D,a). Lower ranks denote higher preference.
**Answer: a.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 3 and 3.
**2. Average:** \[a=\tfrac12(3)+\tfrac12(3)=3.\]
**Answer: 3.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 3 and 0.
**2. Average:** \[b=\tfrac12(3)+\tfrac12(0)=1.5.\]
**Answer: 1.5.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 0 and 3.
**2. Average:** \[c=\tfrac12(0)+\tfrac12(3)=1.5.\]
**Answer: 1.5.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 0 and 0.
**2. Average:** \[d=\tfrac12(0)+\tfrac12(0)=0.\]
**Answer: 0.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 0 and 0.
**2. Average:** \[p=\tfrac12(0)+\tfrac12(0)=0.\]
**Answer: 0.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 0 and 1.
**2. Average:** \[q=\tfrac12(0)+\tfrac12(1)=0.5.\]
**Answer: 0.5.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 1 and 0.
**2. Average:** \[r=\tfrac12(1)+\tfrac12(0)=0.5.\]
**Answer: 0.5.**
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Weight types:** The meet and avoid types each have probability \(1/2\). For this cell, player 1’s type-contingent payoffs are 1 and 1.
**2. Average:** \[t=\tfrac12(1)+\tfrac12(1)=1.\]
**Answer: 1.**
What is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium Strategy of player 1 in this game?
6406535903656.
B
6406535903657.
S
6406535903658.
Either of the two
6406535903659.
None of the two
Published solution
Meet type: player 1 owns rows, player 2 owns columns; pairs are (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & B & S \\ B & (3,1) & (0,0) \\ S & (0,0) & (1,3)\end{array}\]
Avoid type: player 1 owns rows, player 2 owns columns; pairs are (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & B & S \\ B & (3,0) & (0,3) \\ S & (0,1) & (1,0)\end{array}\]
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Respond by type:** Against B, the meet type selects B and the avoid type selects S.
**2. Check player 1:** Against (B,S), player 1 earns 1.5 from B and 0.5 from the other action. Therefore B is the strict best response.
**Answer: A — B.**
A: **Correct:** B gives the higher expected payoff at the pure equilibrium.
B: **Incorrect:** S gives the lower expected payoff at the candidate equilibrium.
C: **Incorrect:** The two actions are not tied at a pure equilibrium.
D: **Incorrect:** A pure Bayesian equilibrium exists.
What is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium Strategy of both types of player 2 in this game?
6406535903660.
(S, B)
6406535903661.
(B, S)
6406535903662.
(S, S)
6406535903663.
(B, B)
Published solution
Meet type: player 1 owns rows, player 2 owns columns; pairs are (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & B & S \\ B & (3,1) & (0,0) \\ S & (0,0) & (1,3)\end{array}\]
Avoid type: player 1 owns rows, player 2 owns columns; pairs are (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & B & S \\ B & (3,0) & (0,3) \\ S & (0,1) & (1,0)\end{array}\]
Player 1 owns rows; columns are player 2’s (meet-type action, avoid-type action). Entries are player 1’s expected payoffs, not payoff pairs.
\[\begin{array}{c|cccc} & BB & BS & SB & SS \\ B & 3 & 1.5 & 1.5 & 0 \\ S & 0 & 0.5 & 0.5 & 1\end{array}\]
**1. Respond by type:** Against B, the meet type selects B and the avoid type selects S.
**2. Check player 1:** Against (B,S), player 1 earns 1.5 from B and 0.5 from the other action. Therefore B is the strict best response.
**Answer: B — (B,S).**
A: **Incorrect:** This plan makes at least one type choose an action that is not a best response to player 1’s equilibrium action.
B: **Correct:** The meet type coordinates and the avoid type chooses the opposite action.
C: **Incorrect:** This plan makes at least one type choose an action that is not a best response to player 1’s equilibrium action.
D: **Incorrect:** This plan makes at least one type choose an action that is not a best response to player 1’s equilibrium action.
Player 1 owns rows; player 2 owns columns. Each pair is (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & Cooperate & Defect \\ Cooperate & (2,2) & (0,3) \\ Defect & (3,0) & (1,1)\end{array}\]
**1. Compare actions:** For each player, Defect pays more against either opponent action (3>2 and 1>0). It is strictly dominant.
**2. Intersect best responses:** Both players defect in the unique stage-game Nash equilibrium.
**Answer: A — (Defect, Defect).**
A: **Correct:** Defect is strictly dominant for both players.
B: **Incorrect:** Each player can gain by defecting against cooperation.
C: **Incorrect:** Mutual cooperation is not a Nash equilibrium.
D: **Incorrect:** The dominant-strategy equilibrium exists.
Suppose, this game is repeatedly played finite times
6406535903668.
In the Last Period Cooperate is a dominant strategy irrespective of history of
the game
6406535903669.
In the Last Period Defect is a dominant strategy irrespective of history of the
game
6406535903670.
In the Last Period Cooperate is a dominant strategy for a particular game
history
6406535903671.
In the Last Period Defect is a dominant strategy for a particular game history
Published solution
Player 1 owns rows; player 2 owns columns. Each pair is (player 1 payoff, player 2 payoff).
\[\begin{array}{c|cc} & Cooperate & Defect \\ Cooperate & (2,2) & (0,3) \\ Defect & (3,0) & (1,1)\end{array}\]
**1. Examine the final period:** With a known finite horizon, no future reward or punishment follows the last action. The final period therefore has the stage-game incentives.
**2. Compare actions:** Defect remains strictly dominant after every possible history.
**Answer: B — In the Last Period Defect is a dominant strategy irrespective of history of the .**
A: **Incorrect:** Cooperation is not dominant in the final stage.
B: **Correct:** Defection is dominant after every history.
C: **Incorrect:** No history reverses the final-stage payoff comparison.
D: **Incorrect:** This understates the result: defection is dominant after every history, not merely one.
